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AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
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Peace as Cant 
 
Once upon a time, as the story goes, 
 
there was a bear who was hungry and a man who was cold, so they 
decided to negotiate in a neutral cave. After several hours a settlement 
was reached. When they emerged the man had a fur coat and the bear was 
no longer hungry (Karrass, 1970: 3). 
 
The saga of the Middle East ‘peace process’ and the fanfare that has surrounded it, obscured 
the fact that little has been subjected to detailed systematic and objective analysis. Nor has it been 
sufficiently put to the test of negotiation principles in a fashion that would shed light on its 
underlying nature and substance. This caveat hindered addressing important questions regarding the 
very structure of the process and its ability to deliver on its purported promises. It further raises 
questions as to whether one could speak of a real peace in the making, or whether the whole 
endeavor is merely used as cant. By cant is meant “a mode of expression, or a cast of thought, of 
which the effect--irrespective of the motive--is to create a misleading discrepancy between the 
natural meaning of words and their practical significance...” (Hugo, 1970: 19). 
In order to understand the full implications and underpinnings of regional politics it is crucial 
to reintroduce some basics of the Arab-Israeli conflict which, have been lost or concealed in the 
maze of peace proclamations. This should not be construed as an attempt at rehashing the polemics, 
arguments and counter-arguments of the past five decades or so, but rather as a bid to expose the 
structural flaws connected with the policies devised to deal with the current regional predicament. A 
careful diagnosis helps in anticipating the patient’s prognosis. 
The origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to the early part of the twentieth century. 
The Zionist movement, founded by Theodore Herzl in the late 1890s, was able to elicit a promise 
from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, committing “His Majesty’s Government” to the 
“establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people...” (Heikal, 1996: 28-29).1 Brief 
statements made by two major figures involved in the Zionist Jewish state project, serve as an 
exemplary of the genesis and stakes of the conflict: the aforementioned Arthur Balfour and David 
Ben-Gurion the first Prime Minister of the newly created state of Israel. Admitting in a 
memorandum to cabinet colleagues in 1919, that the Palestinians had been deceived, Balfour 
attributed the deception to the “Big Four” powers (the US, France, Britain, and Italy), rather than to 
Britain alone. He stated: “so far as Palestine is concerned, the powers have made no statement of fact 
that is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not 
always intended to violate” (Heikal, 1996: 30). As for Ben-Gurion, he stated in 1938:  
 
  
When we say that the Arabs are the aggressors and we defend ourselves-
that is only half the truth. As regards our security and life we defend 
ourselves.... But the fighting is only one aspect of the conflict which is in 
its essence a political one. And politically we are the aggressors and they 
defend themselves (Finkelstein, 1995: 108). 
 
Reverting to the basics of the Arab-Israeli conflict allows us not to lose sight of the politics 
of injustice as an inherent source of antagonisms. The moral foundations of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
do not simply lie in the realm of competing perceptions, but in veracity and justice. Its essence, as 
Balfour’s and Ben-Gurion’s words clearly suggest, is born in a historical injustice inflicted rather 
than in a current violence perpetrated against the Palestinians. Not in a conflict between two rights, 
as Albert Einstein has philosophized, but a situation in which one party is clearly an aggressor and 
the other a victim.2 To frame the matter differently would sound reminiscent of Harry Truman’s 
cynical aphorism “if you can’t convince them, confuse them.” 
In order for such politics not to constitute the sown seeds of a future more violent and bitter 
collision, an important analytical distinction must be made between conflict resolution and 
settlement. The former refers to “the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the 
solution of the problems which, led to the conflictual behavior in the first place.“ The latter 
designates “the suppression of … conflict by coercive means, or by bargaining and negotiation in 
which relative power determines the outcome“ (Burton, 1990: 3). Resolution must incorporate the 
principle of Justice, the salience of which has made the Palestinian issue the core of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Otherwise, it would simply collapse into a reduced settlement arrangement. 
 
Peace Transformation and the Politics of Injustice 
The ‘peace’ process has attempted to circumvent, transform, and conceptually obliterate the 
true nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict by resorting to conventional Western conflict resolution and 
power politics mechanisms. These mechanisms fundamentally altered the political agenda of the 
conflict through subterfuge and issue transformation, imposing and maintaining an asymmetric 
power relationship in favor of the Arabs’ adversary. A development facilitated by systemic and 
regional changes arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War and the 
destruction of Iraq, and American-Israeli military and scientific cooperation. Superordinate axes 
were introduced in order to change the regime of alliances. For the purposes of creating overlapping 
space, ‘moderate’ Arab and Jewish forces supporting ‘peace’ were supposedly to be aligned against 
‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ across both societies, opposing it. A closed Arab agenda would have set 
Islamists and incumbent regimes, at least in principle, as natural allies against a common Israeli 
enemy. Arab governments instead, have sought to establish common cause with Israel in fighting 
Islamic resistance to such open concessional schemes. This open agenda evolved into one of 
confronting the effects of injustice rather than its causes, changing the political constellation 
supporting the original principles and re-connecting interests in a fashion that cuts across closed 
foundational considerations. 
Back in January 1989, President Hosni Mubarak (1995) of Egypt proclaimed that he and 
other Arab leaders were supported in their search for peace, among other actors, by “the peace 
loving forces in Israel itself.” To make his starting point clear, he indicated that after all the 
sacrifices due to previous wars with Israel, he “was not ready to take more risks” (Mubarak, 1995: 
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546-547). In one stroke, Mubarak was acknowledging the conflict to be one of costs rather than of 
entitlements, conveying a willingness to play by the rules of the opponent rather than his own. A less 
than inspiring overture from someone engaged in a protracted and gruesome process of conflict 
management. Expressing his rather limited understanding of the Vietnamese case as an example of a 
war that “was settled only through negotiations,” Mubarak failed to relate the outcome to the 
conditions on the ground and from there on draw the relevant conclusions. The Vietnamese had been 
willing to take risks and consequently were successful in imposing their will on a much more 
powerful adversary.  
According to Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, inferior power is not in and of itself the most 
important determinant of outcome. Resolve plays an extremely important role as well. “The military 
inferiority of one party may be compensated by its greater interests engaged, thus making the parties 
equally resolved. A militarily stronger party may be less ‘resolved’ in the crisis than its opponent if 
it does not value its interests as highly as the opponent values his” (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 498). 
Exacerbating their military inferiority by translating it into a lack of determination, the Arab party’s 
starting point to negotiations conversely, was to concede entitlement claims from the very outset. 
For to recognize Israel, is invariably to recognize the right to dispossess the Palestinians and to 
occupy Arab land in defense of such dispossession. This gradual yet steady concessionary Arab 
behavior served implicitly and/or explicitly to self-condemn earlier policies and stances adopted vis-
a-vis Israel, and to undermine the justice principle. In essence, the Arabs arrived at a situation in 
which they became susceptible to recognizing their values to be, if not wrong, then at least faulty. 
Since at a point they became actually willing to relinquish what they had considered sacred for the 
past five decades or so, further pressure, so the justified expectation would be, may lead them to 
concede other rights and Jerusalem as well. The late king Hasan of Morocco and president to the 
Jerusalem Committee, for instance, had indicated that Jerusalem constituted to the Arabs nothing 
more than the sacred sites, such as “Al-Aqsa Mosque” (Hasan, 1999: 172). Statements of the kind 
undermine rights to land restoration and liberation. 
Such precedents introduced structural transformations capable of concomitantly changing the 
psychological distribution of power heavily in favor of Israel. It emasculated the Arab position, first 
and foremost at this level, from defiance to one of virtual submission. Their practical manifestations 
include the degradation of religious consciousness, which is necessary if Jerusalem is to be 
compromised, moral and spiritual decadence in order for people to forsake values such as Jihad and 
the undermining of national and historical self-confidence so as to justify defeatism. Together with 
the media and mind-altering changes in Arab educational systems, they came to constitute what 
President Clinton has termed “education for peace.” As a settlement mechanism the ‘peace’ process, 
has recast the substance of the conflict by steadily creating the appropriate environmental means-
ends framework for such ‘concessions’ to be made.  
Negotiation constitutes the “art of the dialectics of wills that use force (and/or peaceful 
measures) to resolve their conflict” (Luttwak, 1987: 241). Strategies, tactics and skill, in addition to 
options and resources available, constitute the pillars of its dynamics. Their overriding principle is 
for one side to take advantage, to the extent possible, of the adversary’s weaknesses, loopholes, and 
oversights. The outcome configuration largely determines the privileged or non-privileged 
translations of any proposed agreements, and heavily influences the subsequent order of events. In 
this sense, negotiation is a double- edged sword. It may resolve conflicts or it may exacerbate them. 
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Setting detailed blueprints or axioms predictive of the ensuing results of a negotiating process 
therefore, is by no means an easy task. It is important nevertheless, to underscore the inter-linked 
premises that “where one ends up depends on where one starts” (Raiffa, 1982: 215); that the final 
outcome of negotiations usually reflects the relative power configuration of the parties concerned 
and; that negotiating outcomes not only emanate from objective material conditions, but as 
importantly, from subjective psychological fortitude. Thus, the weaker side in particular must exhibit 
a good measure of steadfastness in order to establish a credibility threshold for any demands made or 
positions upheld. Otherwise, diminished will power would inevitably translate into a one sided open 
agenda in which--as far as the privileged party is concerned--agreement may not necessarily be 
preferred to non-agreement. Unequal costs emanating from a failure to agree, together with an 
asymmetric capability to modify the reference structure, constitute two determining factors of 
negotiation outcomes. This is especially so in as far as they reflect not simply an imbalance in power 
resources but also in “control relations.” As a reflection of structural asymmetry, they allow for the 
unilateral alteration of the rules of the game and for redefining the norms which all actors are 
expected to follow in their mutual relations (Hopmann, 1978: 143; Vayrynen, 1991: 4-5). Once this 
stage has been reached, it substantively ceases to be negotiation since, “the weak,“ to quote Henry 
Kissinger, “do not negotiate” (Finkelstein, 1995: 237). 
Both the Americans and the Israelis believed that a preliminary step-by-step negotiating 
approach, rather than a comprehensive one, would contribute to undermining the famous Arab 
consensus, agreed at the Khartoum summit in August 1967, of “no talks, no recognition, no peace” 
(Field, 1994: 384). The purpose was to divide the Arab World, win de facto recognition of a few 
countries and put the Israelis in a stronger position when they came to negotiate directly with the 
front-line states and the Palestinians. The idea behind such a strategy which, underscored 
Kissinger’s negotiating style, was to build “positions of strength with an active diplomacy pressing 
for settlement” (Kissinger, 1994: 467ff). Israel’s tactics as Yehoshafat Harkabi (1977: 103) had 
alluded to as early as 1977, was to bring the Arabs into “... step by step, practical settlements and 
interim agreements as a gradual incremental process of ‘interlocking’ the rivals into positive 
arrangements which may make it more difficult for them to revert to open conflict and war.”3 Or in a 
more recent statement by a British diplomat, which mirrors the same position, to create “a complex 
architecture of Arab-Israeli connections... that will not be easily demolished” (Field, 1994: 368). 
Such tactics were consistent with the overall strategy of detaching Egypt from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, isolating Syria, and cantonizing the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, 
they have succeeded in breaking the necessary link between statecraft and war. Once all this had 
been achieved, Israel reversed its position, with the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu calling for “a package approach“ that circumvents earlier agreements made (1997a: 39). 
 
The Peace-Justice Dialectics 
Power relations based on considerations of order and might frequently offend the “sense of 
justice,” and cannot but fuel the emotions of resentment, anger, and tension which, ultimately lead to 
violence. Notions of injustice, as a backlash against perceived disparities between prerogatives and 
benefits, always remain an inherent and perpetual risk factor (Lerner, 1981: 12-13). 'Peace,' merely 
as the opposite of violence rather than as a reflection of justice is unlikely to overcome or rectify 
such concerns. Injustices inflicted by the Western colonial legacy on the Arabs in general and the 
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Palestinians in particular have characterized the nature of the conflict from its very inception as one 
of entitlements-benefits. The erupting sense of injustice triggered intense and unique emotional 
responses which, could not be quantified solely in terms of tangible indices or reduced simply to an 
aversion of loss and an appetite for gain. Phenomenologically “it engage(d) powerful passions that 
have the effect of increasing the stridency of demands, amplifying intransigence, reducing sensitivity 
to threats and value trade-offs, increasing the willingness to run risks, and increasing the likelihood 
of violent behavior” (Welch, 1993: 20). This helps explain the drive behind the martyrdom 
bombings perpetrated by Islamic militant organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah and Jihad, and 
allows putting their militancy in perspective. Their actions largely constitute the observable 
symptoms of the unobservable motivation and need to respond to group insult with rage (Burton, 
1984: 13). Referring to these organizations as terrorist structures opposing peace comprises an 
altering discursive mechanism which seeks to eliminate the entitlement-benefits discrepancy context 
in favor of one re-constructed and based on cost-benefits.  The former then is depicted as irrational 
and the latter as rational. Historical experiences however, show that when basic entitlements are at 
stake against overwhelming odds, less rationality is needed, and actually fares better, than more 
rationality. For instance, the Czechs’ behavior with respect to Nazi Germany’s demands on their 
land, in Michael Handel’s (1981: 91) words, was “too rational“ in response to a military threat they 
believed they could not win out against in the long run. This was in stark contrast to the Finns and 
the North Vietnamese who were less calculating, more emotional, and more determined to fight 
against the overwhelming powers of both the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. The 
Finns, while losing twice, earned respect and admiration and perhaps made themselves less attractive 
as potential satellites. In the case of the North Vietnamese, they ultimately prevailed and won a war 
in which they virtually had lost all the battles. One can not help but wonder what the outcome might 
have been had the Vietnamese, alternatively like the Arabs, started doubting themselves. The 
constructed ‘peace’ discourse, based on such self-doubts, makes it immensely easier for the 
Americans and Israelis to manipulate parties whose strategic calculations can be transformed toward 
cost-benefit quantification (the Czech option). This as opposed to actors who consciously adhere to 
their own strategic imperatives, irrespective of costs (the Finnish or Vietnamese option). The former 
constitutes a strategic victory, the latter a strategic challenge.  
The justice motive differs from loss aversion or appetite for gain in two further respects: 
prescriptively and extensively. Prescriptively, the very desire to see justice done ‘though the earth 
may perish’ is a very strong drive embedded in basic and non-negotiable human needs and values. 
This sets them in stark contrast to material valuations based on economy or self-interest. 
Extensively, it does not overreach to what people simply would like to have, but rather to what they 
consider to be their entitlements. In this respect, it is categorical and demanding of nothing less than 
full satisfaction. People within the entitlement-benefits value matrix are usually willing to incur a 
heavy price for potentially less useful things they consider a matter of right. They are also more 
willing to trade-off or forswear pursuing goods which, they would like to have but to which they do 
not necessarily feel particularly entitled.  “The mode of reasoning involved in the defense of one’s 
entitlements,“ therefore, “differs fundamentally from the mode of reasoning involved in the pursuit 
of other goods: it tends to be categorical and deontological rather than utilitarian” (Welch, 1993: 20-
21). 
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Substantively, Israel with the aid of American indifference if not complicity, attempted to 
reconcile the entitlement-benefits discrepancy. This was done not by meeting Palestinian legitimate 
demands for statehood, but by transforming the rules in a fashion that would increasingly lead the 
Palestinian Authority, headed by Yasser Arafat, to act--if not actually believe--as if it has 
misconceived the scope and content of Palestinian entitlements (Welch, 1993: 20). According to 
Harkabi (1977: 88), “making the opponent uneasy and apologetic about his objective, is a first small 
step in the process of its erosion, inducing him to start discarding it.” 
The expectations of the Palestinian negotiator presumably anticipated a Palestinian state at 
the end of the road. The pattern of negotiations it followed, however, appears in all practicalities to 
have reduced the Palestinian Authority (PA) to nothing more than an auxiliary Israeli security 
structure. Israel’s further de-linking of security matters from changes taking place on the ground in 
Jerusalem and the West Bank and therefore from the political heart of the ‘peace’ process, reflected 
the divesting of the purported Palestinian/Arab negotiating formula. Israel continues to maintain its 
own constants and payoffs in terms of a unified Jerusalem under its control, entitlement to most of 
the West Bank (notwithstanding redeployment maneuverings), monopolized access to nuclear 
weapons, priority of its security concerns over all other considerations, and eventual access to the 
water resources of the River Nile and the Euphrates (Lesch, 1992: 158).4  
America’s rather explicit recognition of the legitimacy of this agenda was manifested most 
conspicuously by the Congress’s vote (even if non-binding) to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem 
by 1999. US envoy Dennis Ross’ statements, during his August 1997 visit to the region, in the wake 
of bombings in Jerusalem by Hamas militants, attempted to further entrench the Palestinian 
negotiator within this de-linking structure. He called upon Israelis and Palestinians to work as 
partners against a “common threat” from militants, and emphasized that “security is something that 
serves Israeli interests and Palestinian interests...” (Goller, 1997: A15). Israeli security was to 
become the Palestinian Authority’s own, irrespective of whether or not Palestinian demands for 
statehood can or will be met. In return for Arafat’s resumption of security cooperation with Israel to 
rein in Islamic militants, a vague promise was given by Ross of an upcoming broad US peace 
initiative. Supposedly it was to address Palestinians' complaints against Israel, including reportedly, 
some kind of freeze on Israeli expansion of colonies (conveniently termed settlements), and an 
acceleration of talks on a final peace settlement (Assad, 1997). However, American Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright’s response during her subsequent visit to the region in September 1997, to 
complaints that Israel was strengthening its grip on Jerusalem, expanding Jewish colonies and 
leveling the homes of Palestinians, was unequivocal. “There is no moral equivalent,” she stated 
“between killing people and building houses.... The Palestinian Authority must take unilateral steps 
and actions to root out the terrorist infrastructure” (Schweid, 1997). The problem with unilateral 
gestures as Kissinger (1994: 488) has indicated, is that they “remove a key negotiating asset. In 
general, diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered...” Moreover, they tempt the adversary 
“...to drag out the negotiations in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures may be 
forthcoming.” Not only that, but Albright was also making the connection between militant acts and 
the peaceful process of building houses, rather than to the breaking of agreements and Israeli 
colonial expansion. In as far as she was interested in accomplishing any significant results, it was to 
call for holding financial contributions to Islamist groups, and to cajole Arab regimes into attending 
the upcoming economic conference to be held in Doha, Qatar, in November of that year. Ross’ 
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earlier promises--and for that matter any upcoming ones--to Arafat are unlikely to be any different 
from the British WWI superfluous offerings to give Arabs their independence in exchange for 
support in the war effort against Ottoman Turkey. In essence, nothing has been learned, nothing has 
been forgotten. 
Arafat’s relationship with Islamist groups is significantly complex to allow for the above 
demands to be conceded, at least in their US-Israeli ideal. Much as he would like to clamp down on 
their infrastructure, he remains strongly constrained as to how far he could go. In many ways, his 
fate has become intertwined with their own to the extent that by destroying them he could virtually 
be committing political suicide. Eradicating Hamas and Jihad could greatly diminish the need for his 
presence as a party altogether. When newspaper photos had depicted Arafat embracing Hamas 
figures, they were basically showing him holding to his last trump card. This is where the inherent 
contradictions of a common security framework can be most strongly felt. The major caveat is that 
while the Israelis would like to see Islamic opposition eradicated, the most that Arafat could do, if 
for no other reason than to ensure his own survival, is to contain and weaken but not eliminate them. 
The logical outcome is that both the PA and Israel can only pursue a parallel rather than a common 
security policy. This poses Arafat’s dilemma. It serves to project him both as a collaborator, to many 
Palestinians, and as an ineffective and uncooperative ‘negotiator,’ as the US and the Israelis allege. 
Such an ambivalent outcome could only lead to the eventual erosion of the PA’s legitimacy, forcing 
it to control its own people by increasingly coercive measures. As Glenn E. Robinson (1997: 54) has 
stated, “...PLO failure to deliver Palestinian rights will compel the PA to tighten the noose around its 
own society. Open politics in the midst of national failure is not a recipe for regime survival.” It 
should come as no surprise therefore that Arafat would accept internal security guardianship by the 
CIA on his people through the Wye River agreements. 
Israeli security officers further have warned that enfeebling Arafat could open the door for 
Hamas to achieve political dominance in Gaza and parts of the West Bank (Drozdiak, 1997b: A14). 
Capitalizing on such a trade-off, Arafat continues to project himself as the one most capable of 
controlling and possibly coopting those groups. In as much as the Israelis may loathe him, he stands 
as the best of two evils. Arafat has become an Israeli interest and safety valve. His rumblings that he 
will not be dictated to by Israel do not hide his real concern. The Washington Post, referring to 
statements made by Palestinian officials, has indicated that he remains constrained by the fear of 
generating sympathy for Islamic militants by acquiescing to Israeli demands (Drozdiak, 1997a: 
A01). His holding of “national unity” talks, during the latter half of August 1997, and then again 
with other dissenting Palestinian groups in September 1999, simply aimed at bringing militants into 
the political process as a way to dilute their influence and persuade them to abandon their actions 
and opposition. This reflected a typical pattern of political cooptation reminiscent of Egyptian 
President Sadat’s policies toward Islamist opposition and which ultimately proved fatal for him. 
Furthermore, Arafat continues to concentrate power in his hands. While attempting to weaken all 
other forces and/or rudimentary social institutions (most of which have an Islamic identity), as is 
being demanded by the Israeli side, he continues to personally control money offered by 
international donors. With virtually no accountability, Arafat in all but name has become the PA 
(Robinson, 1997: 45). This significantly consolidates the position of the Israeli negotiator who by 
constructing control structures to ‘handle’ the PA ‘chief’ could indirectly ‘administer’ the ‘tribe’ as 
well. A virtual situation is thus created in which the grand strategy of one side is in effect being 
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tackled in the framework of personal, tribal and ‘fiefdom’ politics, by the Arab side. Though short of 
a state, the PA is not an aberration but rather a typical regional structure, where it only takes control 
of the leader to dominate the hierarchical socio-political configuration.  
 
Peace Concessions and the Strategy of Defeat 
Empirical studies regarding winners and losers in negotiations have indicated that parties 
with higher aspiration levels and wanting more, actually did get more. In a conflictive non-
cooperative bargaining process, opponents with high aspirations, irrespective of their skill or power, 
ended up as winners in every case where they opposed low aspirants. They indicated furthermore, 
that negotiators who made the first compromise ended up being losers in the final outcome (Karrass, 
1970: 17-18 & 19). From the outset and as a reflection of collapse of will, the Egyptian side had 
declared itself desperate to opt out of confrontation. Since the Israeli side did not exhibit such 
desperation, it becomes clear that negotiation terms can only be strategically tilted in its favor, with 
the outcome most likely to reflect that condition. In light of such findings, it follows that the 
strategic concessions initiated by the late President Anwar Sadat through the Camp David regime, 
and in whose footsteps a number of other Arab leaders are following, can only lead to disastrous 
consequences for the Arab World. 
Such a pattern of concessions can never be fair or just to the Arabs due to several reasons. 
Firstly, concessions are fair only as long as the negotiators have no need to revise their original 
expectations about what the ultimate agreement will be or about their strategic goals of entitlement 
(Bartos, 1978: 22). Yet, while Mubarak’s chief political adviser Usama al-Baz conceded that the 
conflict between the Arabs and Israel was over boundaries and no longer over the latter’s existence, 
former Israeli chief of staff Raphael Eitan declared the Arab-Israeli conflict to be “civilizational“ 
(Kayhan al-Arabi, 1998: 11). This reflects a remarkable strategic turn of events in favor of the Israeli 
negotiator, confirming the conclusion that a negotiating opponent will concede in opposite 
proportion to the adversary's concession rate (Cross 1978: 29). 
Secondly, negotiation requires that parties be constrained by the same rules which, neither 
side have the right nor capability to alter unilaterally. If negotiation is a matter of finding the proper 
formula as a referent principle, and then implementing detail (Zartman 1978: 76-77), and if one 
party has the capability of changing it at will while the other is constrained by it, then no element or 
mechanism of joint decision-making does in reality exist. Both parties cease to share equal 
stalemating power, and the asymmetry is such that one party could at will alter the terms of the 
negotiating formula from land for peace as formulated at the Madrid conference in October 1991, to 
one of peace for peace or security for peace. Strictly speaking then, there are no negotiations taking 
place between the Arabs and the Israelis even as they continue to talk to each other. Israel’s formula 
alteration capability reorders the whole process in its own image against the opposite number, a 
strategic advantage that is unlikely to be thrown away whether the Likud party is in power or Labor. 
Yet, Arab negotiators continue to project the personalized nature of their own governance onto the 
‘other’ even when the Labor party had been doing by stealth what the Likud party implemented 
unpresumptuously.5 Negotiations in October 1999, between the Palestinian and the newly elected 
Israeli Labor government, which set security matters in the hands of the Israelis on the “safe 
passage” road linking Gaza to the Western Bank, actually constituted an additional Palestinian 
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concession to the security formula. This concession was more than could have been possible earlier 
during the incumbency of Likud’s conspicuously intransigent leadership. 
Such attitude reflects Arab susceptibility to (and naive entanglement into) the 
psychologically deceptive good-guy (Labor)/bad-guy (Likud) routine. Within this framework, two 
parties on the same side stage a quarrel related to seemingly opposed stances with respect to a 
common adversary. The good guy offers promises of reward if the opponent cooperates, the bad guy 
raises the specter of punishments if no ‘cooperation’ was forthcoming (Fisher & Ury, 1983: 141-
142). Arafat, during his appearance at the United Nations in October 1998, continued to hold to the 
belief that the assassinated Yitzhak Rabin was his partner in peace, and to lament his loss. This 
despite Kissinger’s statement that the latter had repeatedly brought it to his attention that should the 
‘incongruities’ of the Oslo agreements become pervasive, “he would initiate a strategic reassessment 
with all the greater determination because of a clear conscience” (Kissinger, 1997: C07). In between 
Labor (good guy) and Likud (bad guy) the psychological fabric of the target opponent is 
undermined, softening his will to the level of concessionary pliance in order to escape emotional 
distress. Any semblance of concession offered by the good guy would then be seen as a big favor to 
be reciprocated with a supposedly sizable concession lest ammunition be provided to alternative 
‘radical or extremist’ forces. A dynamic of escalating demands for every concession offered, not 
necessarily made, is thus introduced into the negotiating framework.6 Arab negotiators should not 
act perplexed as they come to face this situation with a Labor negotiator.  
A dual routine of this kind, one should add, requires formal autonomous domestic 
institutional structures which, do not exist in the Arab world. One party to the negotiating table is 
capable of playing a game that the other side is structurally deprived off, and as such is at a constant 
disadvantage. Having been situated in an external rule structure the Arabs have come up against a no 
win situation. This applies whether they make one decision or its opposite. It should come as no 
surprise that Arafat has lost on both accounts when he continued to threaten to declare a Palestinian 
state in May 1999 only to back down as expected. To declare a state was simply to end up with a 
cluster of disparate villages beyond which he could make no further demands (assuming Israel does 
not respond by reentering the territory under PA authority). Having retracted however, he continues 
to lose much of his already shaky credibility not only with regard to his people, but also vis-a-vis the 
enemy. In strategic terms he has continuously and perpetually been placed on a ‘horn of a dilemma.’ 
Thirdly, geo-strategic considerations related to the very nature of the Zionist Jewish 
homeland project continue to play a determining role in the negotiation outcomes and the politics of 
concessions. In a superbly detailed and documented three volumes study about secret negotiations 
between the Arabs and Israel over the last hundred years or so, Mohamed Heikal (1996b: 27ff) 
illustrated that the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine hark back to the days of 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s French occupation of Egypt (1798-1801). This clearly was long before Herzl 
and the events of WW II. As part of his grand strategy, Napoleon believed that Egypt and Syria’s 
security, both being situated along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 
respectively, were historically and strategically intertwined. In order to secure his power base in both 
countries, he believed that a foreign (Jewish) structure at their meeting point had to be created. The 
idea was to separate and prevent them from coming together in any form of common political 
framework. With the defeat of the Napoleonic armies this strategy was appropriated and actively 
pursued by Great Britain’s Lord Palmerston, during the first half of the 19th century onward. While 
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the reduction of the Palestinian issue to a matter of land and territory veiled the significance of this 
purpose, the Israeli negotiators could not but harbor it, albeit indirectly, as a strategic factor in their 
policy calculations. Responding to a question by Newsweek as to whether he envisions a Palestinian 
state, Netanyahu answered a categorical “no.” More interestingly, he added, “...I believe that the 
granting of unlimited self-determination would mean that we would face a Palestinian army with 
heavy weapons, a state that could make military pacts with countries like Iran or Iraq...” (Netanyahu, 
1997a: 39). Israel, he declared, “will not reduce itself to a fragile ghetto on the shores of the 
Mediterranean” (Netanyahu, 1997b: 13). Given that the envisioned Palestinian pseudo-state could 
hardly pose such a serious threat as Netanyahu claims, even if such pacts were presumably to be 
made, more must be read between the lines. The Israeli negotiator seems to be hinting that no mass 
of land, however small yet adequate enough to help re-establish the severed Egyptian-Levant 
strategic link, would be allowed. Implicitly underscored is not the issue of a reduced territorial size, 
which had actually sustained this state until 1967, but one of role as a link-severing structure. This 
attribute contributes to a large extent to Israel’s geo-strategic relevance. The Israeli negotiator is 
unlikely to accept a condition in which, the Jewish state could be by-passed or cut through. This 
after all, is what could turn Israel into a ghetto, and this is largely what will contribute to 
determining the Israeli position regarding a sovereign Palestinian state. Former Prime Minister and 
Labor Party leader Shimon Peres’ suggestion that Israel should be allowed to take the “reins of 
leadership in the Middle East” instead of Egypt was part and parcel of this consistent vision (Gerges, 
1995: 71). 
The coming of Ehud Barak to power brought little change despite the visible sigh of relief 
among Arab officials. In the same vein as his predecessor, he called for combining certain “parts” of 
the 1998 Wye River agreement with Oslo's final status negotiations. Not only that, but shortly after 
he had come to power, his government expanded colonies construction at a much faster pace than 
that of Netanyahu's (Al-Ahram, 1999a: 8). In addition, he declared that Jerusalem was to remain “the 
eternal and indivisible Capital” of the Jewish state and, that there would be no return to the pre-1967 
borders. He also rejected the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland, and suggested only the 
possibility of a withdrawal “on” rather than “from” the Syrian heights. These positions were 
accompanied by a stream of statements declaring a commitment to peace, and even setting a year 
2000 deadline for an agreement (Usher, 1999). 
Finally, while any concessions that the Israeli side may offer or make can only be from gains 
and profits acquired at the expense of the Arab side, reciprocal concessions by the Arabs can only be 
offered from their own capital. A framework of mutual concessions while in appearance 
procedurally fair hides a substantive injustice inflicted on one negotiating party. If the claim is made 
that this is natural given the facts on the ground and that Israel has acquired Arab land by winning 
militarily, whatever the justifications may be, and that the strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must, then the whole negotiating exercise becomes one in which the victor is 
basically imposing its will over the vanquished. This essentially, dissolves the very substance of 
negotiation and reduces it to one of how to yield the best surrender scenario. 
The Palestinian leader committed a serious strategic mistake when he conceded to interim 
agreements at the expense of postponing the fundamental issues of Jerusalem, the refugees, and the 
fate of Jewish colonies for future talks, (i.e. emphasizing the process of interaction rather than the 
content of the negotiated positions). In so doing he was following in Sadat's prenegotiation footsteps 
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when, together with Israel, both had sought to narrow the upcoming negotiation agenda to be 
undertaken at Camp David, by elimination or postponing the most controversial issues. The purpose 
was to reduce uncertainty and complexity and to lessen anticipated costs for Israel (Stein 1989b: 
255; Stein 1989a: & 174-205).7 Blunders of the kind were a reflection of the Arab/Palestinian 
negotiators’ inability to rank strategic priorities of collective national interests, goals and objectives, 
and their confusion of means and ends. Within the framework of a confidence building process as 
opposed to that of content, top priority tends to be credited to current and ad hoc problems as 
opposed to long term strategic considerations. Each and every concern as a result, becomes a matter 
of top priority to be addressed by the force of circumstances, basically propelling a policy of survival 
that renders equal importance to hierarchical issues. Strategies, however, must be set on a priority 
basis. If priorities are confused, which a framework based on process rather than content actually 
leads to, then no long term collective national interest strategy could be focused upon, nor could a 
decision about the channeling and commitment of resources be made. Process becomes an end in 
and of itself rather than the means it is supposed to be. This helps explain Barak’s call upon Syria to 
join the “peace of the brave” and Syria’s sober reluctance to do so. Syria’s approach reflects an 
astute awareness of the dimensions of the conflict, which go beyond land. Unlike Sadat and Arafat, 
Hafez Asad does not seem inclined in his pattern of negotiation to lose the whole (Syria) so as to 
bring back the part (the Golan heights) into his fold. 
Such loss of strategic balance is what has allowed Peres to acknowledge that at Oslo II Israel 
had in fact “screwed the Palestinians” (quoted by Chomsky 1996: 6). Whatever Western conflict 
management framework is put forth, Arabs can only emerge as losers. As Carl Schmitt (1976: 49) 
has observed, 
 
...as long as a people exists in the political sphere this people must, even 
if only in the most extreme case...determine by itself the distinction of 
friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of its political existence. 
When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this 
distinction, it ceases to exist politically. If it permits this decision to be 
made by another then it is no longer a politically free people and is 
absorbed into another political system. 
 
In ending the intifada and signing the Oslo accords Arafat gave up two of his most important 
trump cards without receiving anything of substance in return. His errors further lifted any 
embarrassment considerations standing in the way of other Arab and non-Arab countries 
normalizing and establishing relations with Israel. This effectively bolstered its regional and 
international status and ended its isolation. The PA winded up wasting the very limited leverage it 
might have had. In the process it placed itself in its enemy’s grip, and in that of its American ally, in 
much the same fashion, although under much worse conditions, as the Egyptian negotiator had done 
earlier.  
With the exception of the highly skilled Asad of Syria, a look at the behavioral 
characteristics of Arab decision-makers and their negotiating competence reveals a significant 
propensity to modify the values at stake in a fashion that ultimately challenges their own 
entitlements. This means that a pattern of unfair concessions is being made which will continue to 
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manifest loss of control over economic and political outcomes. An opened Arab agenda was, being 
unfairly reciprocated by a closed Israeli one. And while failure to match concessions may be a 
necessary though not sufficient condition of unfairness, the latter condition will inevitably exist if 
the opponent’s payoffs have not changed (Bartos, 1978: 22). Palestinian rights and demands for 
viable statehood are unlikely to go heeded or materialize since nothing in the negotiating pattern of 
the PA would allow for such an outcome. Parallel expectations on the broader Arab front, continue 
further, to decreasingly vary in light of their adversary’s initiative dynamics. Such concessionary 
patterns continue to undermine Arab political existence. 
 
The Politics of Peace Dialectics 
The key toward winning a negotiating outcome is to change the perception, and in the 
process, the stakes of the opponent. As a reflection of American thought logic and presumably their 
intent, I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman (1982) provided an example of two antagonists 
clashing over the same piece of land--without naming any specific parties. If ‘both’ parties’ 
perceptions could be changed, they reasoned, so as to convince them that it is the resources which 
the land holds that matter, then the two may be able to negotiate a deal whereby one can be the 
owner of the territory while the other shares in the benefits of the resources (Zartman & Berman, 
1982: 13). Translated into the ‘peace’ process context, Arab perceptions are to be changed in favor 
of remunerative incentives (e.g. through economic cooperation, joint economic projects, and aid), 
while Israel is to acquire the land and perhaps even, the water resources. Anis Mansour (1999), a 
columnist in Egypt’s Al-Ahram newspaper, for instance wrote that the countries of the Nile basin 
would not object to Egypt extending the Nile water to adjacent countries such as Israel, Palestine 
and Jordan if they were to be adequately paid, and if Egypt was to be remunerated for allowing 
water to pass through its territory (Mansour, 1999: 36).8 Since such statements are unlikely to be 
made nonchalantly, given the Egyptian social, economic and political scene, one can not but 
anticipate further concessions of the kind down the road. Especially so when they were published 
only one day after the same newspaper had disclosed an American commitment to Israel to assist it 
in accessing water resources from within the region (Al-Ahram, 1999b: 1 & 4). 
The whole issue is transformed from entitlement values to utilitarian calculations. The 
strategic cost of such a transformation would be tremendous. Rather than being the most powerful 
Nile basin country at its downstream, Egypt instead would be squeezed between a more powerful 
Israel (which would now become a Nile basin country!) in control both at downstream and at the 
source. This is not difficult to gauge if one is to closely observe the American-Israeli collaboration 
in the heart of Africa. Matters could be worse of course, if that state were to have commensurate 
access to the Euphrates. Israel would make economic, territorial and strategic strides, while the 
Arabs, notwithstanding some meager financial benefits, if any, would lose on all accounts.  
Much of the inherent failures of Arab decision-makers and negotiators arise from their lack 
of a solid and participating national constituency. Their perennial legitimacy crisis and personalized 
governing style inevitably reflects on their performance and conflict management competence. In his 
book Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, Boutros Ghali (1997), a key figure in the negotiations which led to 
the Camp David accords, indicated that the Egyptian delegation to the US did not know how to 
prepare for the conference. Nor was the general strategy upon which to base its movements clear. As 
he sarcastically suggested, “it was said that Napoleon Bonaparte never set a military plan until he 
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was in the battle field. It dallied my hopes that inspiration would come to us when we arrive at Camp 
David. However, I did not come across signs of Napoleonic genius among us” (Ghali 1997: 137, 
author's translation). This testimony, in itself, constitutes a most serious indictment of the pattern of 
negotiation followed by the Egyptian regime.  
Such indictments, however, do not end with Ghali. Raymond Cohen (1995) in addition 
observed that “...surely the single most noteworthy feature of the Camp David conference of 
September 1978 was Sadat’s willingness to place his own fate and that of his nation in the hands of 
the leader of a foreign power-President Carter.” Being at a total loss as to the next step that should 
follow after his visit to Jerusalem, a condition emanating precisely from the absence of a clear vision 
or strategy, Sadat’s only recourse was to rely on the American President. In as far as he had a 
strategy, it was to “put himself completely into American hands...project(ing) assumptions about the 
value of client status onto his relationship with the United States” (Cohen 1995: 55). Cohen cited 
both Kissinger and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to make his point. According to 
Kissinger, Sadat worked at identifying Egypt’s interest with America’s own, repeatedly challenging 
the US to enter the negotiations not as mediator but as participant, or else he offered to accept what 
was put forward to him (Cohen, 1995: 55, emphasis added). In essence, he put his full trust in the 
American president willing, in the words of Vance, “to take Carter’s word that a given step was 
necessary...” (quoted by Cohen, 1995: 56). Rarely, as Cohen (1995: 56) described it, “can a patron-
client relationship have achieved such pronounced expression.” The logical outcome of this 
negotiating pattern was that Carter put Sadat’s trust to excellent use, although not quite in the way 
that the latter may have expected. “The US president, it turned out, was better able to separate 
business from friendship than the Egyptian leader” (Cohen, 1995: 56). This outcome was a product 
not only of traditional diplomatic frameworks, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration, but also the presumably more advanced methods of conflict resolution. The latter 
emphasize the process of interaction (such as confidence building, education for mutual 
understanding and the pursuit of super-ordinate goals, including of course economic incentives) 
rather than the content of the negotiated positions (Reychler, 1994: 5-7). The two overlapping 
approaches nevertheless compromised core issues, leading Sadat to undermine Arab strategic 
entitlements in favor of short-term Egyptian territorial and financial gains. This ultimately translated 
into continued foreign domination of that country’s decision making structure while providing the 
negotiating adversary with an opportunity to single out its fragmented Arab opponents. 
The tragedy is that the Palestinian Authority seems to be following the same pattern of 
concessions of the Egyptian negotiator, yet without the assets and the leverage that the latter 
possessed. By offering the Israeli side the strategic concession that the largest and most powerful 
Arab country would drop out of the conflict equation, as a bargaining chip, Egypt could make 
territorial gains. Those gains came nevertheless at the cost of a de-militarized Sinai, and almost total 
loss of national independence, sovereignty, and self-esteem, as well as a significantly diminished 
regional status. “In the realm of strategy (however), a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It 
will tend to evolve into its opposite, unless the logic of strategy is outweighted by some exogenous 
change in the circumstances of the participants” (Luttwak, 1987: 18, emphasis in quote). This 
exogenous factor was introduced in Israel’s favor by eliminating Egypt from the conflict matrix and 
neutralizing it as the principal adversary, and is currently being added to by bringing Turkey into the 
conflict as an Israeli ally. This is not in order that the latter may deliver more land subsequently to 
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the rest of the Arabs, but rather to enjoy a freer hand on Egypt’s North-Eastern flank. The Camp 
David accords, in other words, were the high points of the peace strategy after which the reversal of 
opposites can only set in. The more it is pursued the less the returns, until a point is reached where 
negative results can only ensue.9 As Heikal (1996a: 308, author's translation) has stated, 
there is nothing more dangerous-in regional and international politics-
from a condition of war that has stopped without a decisive end and 
without a mutual consent that forsakes (resorting) to arms. Under such a 
condition, explosion becomes possible at any time and without need for 
convincing reasons: for the reasons are inherent in this very condition 
and its nature. 
 
The above factors essentially constitute the dynamics of the peace dialectics. 
The Arab negotiators have three main alternatives: 1--to accept whatever is being imposed on 
them, seeking the best conditions under the circumstances, 2--to stall for time hoping for a reversion 
to the original land for peace formula, or 3--to counter-transform the negotiating rules by bringing in 
their own new formula and redefining the conflict in terms of its broader religious and strategic 
horizons At the same time negotiators would work actively toward the construction of new regional 
and systemic alliances. Opting for the first choice could very well preclude the second but more 
likely add fuel to the third. Mubarak’s (1997: 21) remark to Netanayahu that war is “...an old 
(fashioned) matter...and will not solve any cause” effectively presented the Israeli Prime Minister 
with an altered peace for peace formula. Furthermore, when the threat of economic boycott was 
furled by the Arab League, as a result of Israel’s continued building of colonies in Jabal Ghoneim 
(Har Homa) in occupied East Jerusalem, it was declared as a ‘recommendation’ rather than as an 
obligation. Associated calls for Arab countries to freeze their normalization of relations with Israel 
were declined by both Egypt and Jordan, on the grounds that they were tied to peace agreements 
with Israel which restricted them from doing so. 
To put forth a land for peace formula is to make a conditional statement. Intrinsic to it is a 
presumed veto power: if there is no land returned, there will be no peace. But to what extent can the 
Arabs exude such credibility? The Arab summit which, had convened in Cairo in June 1996, 
announced peace to be a “strategic choice.” Such a declaration de facto rendered land a residual 
component. If war is not an option nor are economic and diplomatic sanctions, then this essentially 
dissolves the Madrid formula, and its supposedly incorporated veto or conditionality. In line with 
Mubarak’s remark, the summit effectively reduced the formula to one of peace for peace’s sake. 
Nations which attempt to present themselves as unfailingly peaceful to the international community 
can hope to obtain little in the way of suasion from any forces they may have (Luttwak, 1987: 194). 
If they do not project much in terms of coercive credibility, sporadic violence will not uphold the 
required veto power. Islamist militants’ bombings for instance, is not the same thing as war 
capability, and could be dealt with at the local security level rather than within the broader context of 
the ‘peace’ process.  
Lacking control over their concession behavior the Arab decision-makers have contributed to 
the elimination of the second option altogether, even though they continue to demand its 
implementation. From then on, they can only move and act within the strict confines of an 
American-Israeli security framework, tilting the balances heavily in favor of option one. 
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Netanyahu’s intransigence and disrespect for agreements previously signed, and his successor’s 
negotiating pattern simply reflect consistent Israeli strategy and beliefs, common sense negotiation 
principles and calculations, and a well thought out understanding of the hard facts of the evolving 
situation. If the Arab negotiators in the course of their concessionary behavior were willing to 
undermine their entitlements, then naturally their opponent would not feel obliged to substantively 
revert to the less favorable linkage of land for peace. This goes for Barak as much as for Netanyahu. 
Netanyahu's less than subtle approach, served to expose three extremely important factors. In 
the maze of the perception altering processes that had overwhelmed the region, those factors were 
conveniently obscured from the Arab and Muslim people: 1--Israel's structural and expansionist 
threat, masked in terms of security concerns, to the whole region and not just the Palestinians, 2--the 
bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, and 3--the true nature and stakes of the civilizational conflict. In as 
far as there had been tense relations between the Clinton administration and Netanyahu, it had to do 
more with the absence of the subtlety required for the pursuance of the above strategy-a strategy 
which the Labor party is perceived to be much more adept at directing. Barak’s style has been more 
effective in reestablishing the space necessary for Arab regimes to make further concessions. In 
many respects and contrary to the impression given by Arab media and officials, Netanyahu has 
been a blessing in disguise. 
 
The Third Option 
In what is tantamount to a vicious circle, capitulation can only add to bitterness, resentment 
and ultimately to the mobilization of forces of indigenous resistance. This would be expected to 
bring forth even if in the long run option three. The Palestinian core of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
obscured the underlying religious and strategic foundations of the colliding wills. In as long as the 
focus was on the presumed confrontation between two nationalisms, Jewish and Palestinian, over the 
same piece of land, these more inherent contradictions were made less visible. 
With the gradual and steady collapse of nationalistic justifications and with the issue of 
Jerusalem coming to the forefront, the Arab-Israeli conflict is being relinked with the religious 
dimension and its coextensive strategic underpinnings. This linkage emerges from the insight that “a 
nation’s interest derive from its identity” (Huntington, 1997: 1). No longer is the confrontation 
solely over the same piece of land or scarce resources, be it territory or water, but more so over 
belief systems and basic values. Since Jerusalem is a religious cause, the clash over it can not be 
secularized (i.e. become solely a political issue). As such ‘peace’ outcomes and legalities will 
always remain marginal considerations applicable in the domain of politics to the extent that the 
coercive framework that produced them continues in place. In the realm of religion such limitations 
may not function as a long-term viable deterrent. The religious logic of the conflict would very 
likely alter the terms of confrontation from reduced objective calculations to subjective metaphysical 
convictions. Such sources of neo-hostility can not be settled by imposing legal norms and enforcing 
them against rule-breakers, since ultimately they are irrelevant to the conflict. Strategic policies of 
deterrence are unlikely to contribute to peace and are more likely to promote conflict as they 
frustrate the pursuit of entitlements, identity, and basic values (Burton, 1984: 137-138). 
In the Arab/Islamic World, Islamist groups are mostly motivated by the justice motive which 
is value oriented (entitlement-benefits), while actors committed to the ‘peace process’ tend to be 
more utility oriented (cost-benefits). Militant Islamic groups, and Muslims in general, continue as a 
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matter of faith and values to refuse to accept the basic existence of the enemy irrespective of what 
takes place at the political level. More fundamentally, these motives continue to be transferred from 
one generation to another in Islamic societies. Secondly, the contending parties to the conflict do not 
see anything in common with one another, nor is there any overwhelming desire or willingness to 
coexist (Abu-Nimer, 1996: 33-34). Thirdly, while the Palestinian issue is being transformed through 
the peace strategy, it is also being counter-transformed into a core religious principle, a substantive 
change foreshadowing a future Islamic-Jewish conflict. Whatever the political outcome of the 
‘peace’ process, it is unlikely to resolve this broader confrontation which is now slowly but steadily 
taking a more ominous tilt. The constant foundations of Islam limit the possibilities of absorbing the 
changes induced or imposed by the ‘peace’ process. This poses an acute problem for the application 
of Western conflict resolution mechanisms in an Islamic context. If a negotiating formula is 
understood to reflect “a shared perception or definition of the conflict that establishes terms of trade, 
the cognitive structure of referents for a solution, or an applicable criterion of justice” (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982: 1-2), then it is clear that it is none of these. Therefore, there is no negotiating formula 
in the first place. Negotiation “as a process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed 
decision, ... based on ... appropriate stages, sequences, behaviors and tactics...” can only fade into 
irrelevance (Zartman & Berman, 1982: 95). 
External mechanisms which, seek to emphasize or artificially construct common and super-
ordinate goals or interests do not apply in this case. They could very well be seen as just another 
attempt at superimposing alien modes of thought and structures. ‘Peace’ as a process of de-
escalation is not value free and does not bear the same implications for the different parties. Western 
power and conflict resolution principles for instance, frequently surmise that ‘peace making’ is not 
possible until conflicts have “ripened“ to the extent where costs have escalated to the point at which 
parties are prepared to settle (Burton, 1990: 88). In the process, “[d]eciding whether or not to try to 
de-escalate a conflict and which strategy to pursue, necessarily involves value preferences regarding 
an acceptable outcome” (Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991: 24). While war may be condemned all along, 
“sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and 
measures to assure peace remain” (Schmitt, 1976: 79). A sweeping look at the Arab/Islamic World 
may help demonstrate the implications: Egypt prostrate and ineffectual, Syria isolated and pressured, 
Jordan an American-Israeli vassal, Palestinians cantonized, Iraq destroyed, Libya and Sudan 
embargoed, the Arabian Peninsula virtually occupied, Algeria having undergone a bloodbath, and 
Iran and other militant Islamist groups being contained or crushed. This condition is contrasted with 
a robust Jewish State, militarily more powerful than all its potential adversaries and nuclear capable 
if not accessible. Given such asymmetry, no substantive inducements exist for a just resolution. 
Furthermore, to capitalize on the outcome of the Second Gulf War as an issue transforming 
event, Field (1994: 385) stressed that as a result of this war, the Arabs have come to recognize “...not 
only that they could not fight Israel but that many of them had no interest in doing so.” A conclusion 
which the majority of the people in the Arab World-as distinct from their largely de-legitimized 
regimes-may not particularly share, yet which mind and perception altering mechanisms seek to 
induce.10 Within this objective and psychological re-construction of the regional order, one can 
perceive Samuel Huntington’s (1993) “Clash of Civilizations” argument not simply as an intellectual 
exercise to be supported or refuted at the academic-analytic level, but more so as the theoretical 
cover for a policy in the actual process of implementation. This policy attempts to procure and 
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justify the ripe environmental conditions for the establishment of ‘peace’ while reconstructing the 
Muslim world and crushing grass roots Islamist groups. To the extent that Islam is an active value 
that determines the subjective, and where and when possible the objective nature of the conflict, it 
constitutes an organizational counter-mechanism which will continue to prohibit the alteration of the 
conflict structure as a zero-sum game. This stems from Arabs’ and Muslims’ awareness that if 
American-Israeli ‘peace’ is to constitute the region’s new interest, this will require the 
transformation of the region’s identity. Islam will be attacked on the plane of its basic values not 
merely on that of the political. 
The fact that Islam is entitlement driven (content-ontological) while the ‘peace’ process is 
cost articulated (process-epistemological), sets both on two incommensurable planes of interaction. 
Harmonizing thought systems alternatively necessitates that they be positioned within the same 
logical framework (Burton, 1990: 89). On the one hand, to harmonize ‘thought logics’ in the 
Arab/Muslim World, with that of the ‘peace’ strategy requires that counter-thoughts be either 
peripheralized and contained, or if necessary crushed. Identity configurations become at stake as 
land, despite its centrality, becomes secondary to more crucial civilizational considerations. Whereas 
an intractable conflict of the Arab-Israeli variety would require the consolidation and mobilization of 
a collective Islamic-Arab identity, the American-Israeli side conversely, has sought to impose the 
state secular identity as the highest value. Continued concessions by the Arab side have allowed 
their opponents to impose their own desired configuration. Primary and/or secondary identities are 
imposed not chosen as a result, as a direct outcome of the very structure of the negotiating process. 
This provided the Americans and the Israelis with the opportunity to single out the Arab parties. By 
accomplishing this purpose they have caused the Arabs to pursue contradictory and conflicting state 
policies, which ultimately led to their fragmentation, bringing them under virtual American (and 
Israeli) colonization and/or domination. Even by the standards of primacy of state values, the Arab 
‘state’ has been a failure.11 The exterme hostility to Islamist currents by parties to the ‘peace’ 
process actually reflects their opposition to any potential reconfiguration of regional identity in favor 
of religio-strategic valuations. Herein lies the essence of the so called‘clash of civilizations’ and its 
camouflaged link to the ‘peace’ process. All else is detail. On the other hand, an Arab negotiator 
whose thought logic is reconstructed within the very framework of his adversary’s is reduced 
basically to a supplicant rather than a counterpart. His will and perceptions of reality continue to be 
managed and altered by the opponent, with any settlement arrived at likely to hinge solely on 
contingent power relations.  
In focusing on the new Islamic enemy, the US has targeted what it calls ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘terrorist’ groups, aiming with the collaboration of client regimes and to different degrees of success, 
at neutralizing and marginalizing them. Any Islamist oppositional group was depicted as a “disturber 
of peace...(and) designated to be an outlaw of humanity” (Schmitt, 1976: 79). Yet in so doing, both 
parties seem to overlook “...the dynamic way in which the environment of conflict gets out of 
control” (Burton, 1990: 52). While it may be feasible to crush such groups through the 
overwhelming power of the state and/or external assistance, this does not solve the problem as long 
as the environmental conditions leading to their emergence remain in place and regenerate. 
Secondly, their suppression does not necessarily lead to the containment of Islamic dynamism, since 
the vitality of Islam is not constrained by, nor dependent upon their existence. Islam has a long and 
inherent tradition of revival, renewal and resurgence. Thirdly, even though many of those groups 
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could or had been actually marginalized, by mainstreaming Islam in public life and society at large, 
they have nevertheless succeeded in scoring a major strategic victory. Despite his assessment of 
political Islam as a failure, Olivier Roy (1994: 78) could still notice that although the specter of 
Islamic revolution has been fading, Islamic symbols continue to penetrate the society and the 
political discourse of the Muslim world more than ever. In a dialectical fashion, the retreat of 
political Islam has been accomplished by the advancement of Islam as a social condition. What Roy 
does not appear to anticipate is the dynamics of exponential change that is independent of the 
existence of politicized groups but which, if unhindered, would ultimately lead to their victory. 
Exponential change is a substantive process, which involves a preliminarily slow and gradual 
subterranean shift.12 In its earlier stages it borders on being imperceptible or even natural, calling for 
no special attention or in all practicalities not much could be done about it. Serious difficulties 
would arise, for instance, if Muslims were to be pressured or dissuaded from practicing their faith or 
rituals. But then, rituals do have practical social consequences and implications, which can not be 
isolated from the overall environment. They keep the faith and its values alive and are the 
foundations of its reproduction and its social and political influence. Under stress, they are 
frequently imbued with socio-political content as an expression of protest and opposition. Given the 
nature of the conflict promoting environment created by ‘peace’ dialectics and its concomitant 
structures, ‘social’ Islam at one stage or the other may very well transform into a political wave of 
mainstream religious activism engulfing society at large. ‘Peace’ dialectics become conducive to the 
development of a religio-national psychological mode, cutting across diverse social strata, strongly 
disposed toward resisting its impositions. This transformation, while subtle, inevitably reflects the 
substantive differences in conflict perceptions based upon costs as opposed to entitlements. In 
contradistinction to the former quantification, the latter demarcations will be “basic,” “fundamental,” 
“consciousness” based and “less mutable” (Huntington, 1993: 22 & 29). Very few if any of the 
existing regimes appear capable, willing or qualified to make credible claims to such alternatives or 
deal with their transformative implications. For instance, Osama al-Baz, (1998: 6) the political 
advisor to Mubarak responded to the Israeli negotiator’s stalemating intransigence by declaring that 
the Arab states have ‘several’ options, the most important of which is the convening of a new 
international conference to save the peace process. Such statements which, reflect bankruptcy rather 
than the availability of any real choice structure, manifest a condition of entrapment. Entrapment is a 
decision-making process “whereby (regimes) escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, 
though failing, course of action in order to justify or ‘make good on’ prior investments.” This 
dynamic frequently leads to ‘irrational’ decision making and outcomes to the extent that it escalates 
commitment when de-escalation or opting out may be the more intelligent thing to do (Brockner & 
Rubin, 1985: 5 & 7).13 And while it may be argued that an alternative Islamist agenda may offer no 
assurances for a successful extrication, it would uphold a real measure of commitment and hope, 
given that the only guarantee the virtually failing ‘state’ seems to be able to offer is abject defeat.  
The ‘peace’ process is contributing to the regeneration and the recharging of its own nemesis 
by reconnecting religion to the internal and external organizing principles of politics and strategy. 
Such linkage would allow for an ideological thrust to bear, that could serve to mobilize 
Arab/Muslim society and to channel its commitments toward the counter-transformation of the 
negotiating rules. Islam as a national resource could create options and space that are vital within the 
context of the threats that the Arab and Muslim nation face. By redefining the conflict in terms of its 
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broader religious and strategic horizons, while working actively toward the construction of new 
identity reconfigurations, Islam could provide for a situation in which “an asymmetry in the 
[re]evaluation of stakes may offset an asymmetry in the national power of the participants in a 
struggle” (Lockhart, 1979: 93). Such potential may heavily tilt the balance against the existing 
negotiating regimes and erode their sense of security and legitimacy. Neutralizing such challenges 
has called for a collaborative effort, between local rulers on the one hand, and regional and global 
forces on the other, in order to crush militant or serious oppositional manifestations. Through 
suppression and ‘education for peace’ they seek to snuff out the very value system upon which 
Muslims’ motivations may come to be based on (i.e. Islam itself). ‘Peace’ and war on Islam/justice 
have become two congruent if not, in many ways, identical processes. 
 
Conclusion 
Religious and strategic factors continue to converge and conflate in their own special way, as 
the prospects of the American-Israeli ‘peace’ persist in harboring the roots of humiliation and 
bitterness. Defining Islam as the new enemy after the collapse of communism constitutes a strategic 
decision foreshadowing the American-Israeli project of redrawing the political and potentially 
geographical map of the Arab World. This upcoming wave will not only target disparate or 
marginalized Islamist groups or just Muslim regimes, but more broadly mainstream Islam and 
mainstream society. Expectations of the kind have slowly introduced a subtle messianic streak in 
conflict perceptions among many Muslims, and contributed to projecting images of upcoming 
apocalyptic events. 
These policies, aiming at restructuring regional identities, are becoming increasingly 
transparent, exposing Israel not solely as a Palestinian national security threat, but a much broader 
Arab/Islamic one. The conflict will likely continue to transform in direct proportion to the increasing 
intensity of threat perceptions. That Islam is being politicized is not simply a matter of a religious 
doctrine that does not allow for the separation of religion and politics, but more fundamentally, a 
matter of justice and strategic considerations as well as religious convictions. In its call to arms, 
Islam is not about violence and extremism but about the legitimate and unequivocal right to self-
defense. It is a statement that threats to security, identity and religious values can not be contained 
by suppression or by mere settlement arrangements. By the same token, ‘peace’ as cant is not about 
negotiations and cooperation but about the destruction of values. It is a statement that motives, at the 
very core of human needs and existence, will have to be neutralized and/or compromised.  
Western conflict resolution mechanisms do not seem to be well equipped to cope with these 
unique characteristics of present and future Arab-Israeli antagonisms, nor with their neo-hostility 
structures. Available theoretical constructs have externalized religious beliefs as determining 
components, reducing them to culturally alterable variables. Religiously held convictions, and 
especially Muslims’ views of their Jewish/Zionist adversary, remain fixed conflict parameters. 
Conflict theory’s reaction was to continue to reject such factors, largely as a source of cognitive 
dissonance, and to perceive religion more as a matter of unwelcome complexity that falls beyond the 
limits of the field, except perhaps as a reduced cultural variable. As a result, acts of violence and 
resistance perpetrated under the rubric of religious justification are either condemned as terrorist 
aberrations or analyzed and understood in a rather condescending fashion. What these theories have 
utterly failed to do is to address crucial questions regarding whether “the weak have the right to 
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make a different set of rules for themselves” (Orwell, 1981: 40). More importantly, how conflict 
mechanisms can cope with the Israeli-Palestinian showdown as only one facet of a multi-
dimensional conflict in which religion is a parameter not a variable, as these mechanisms imply. 
These implicit yet very real underpinnings will continue to undermine the impositions of the ‘peace’ 
process. The fear that the Arab/Muslim World would go ‘Islamist’ is the fear that Western 
settlement mechanisms do not and cannot meet the basic human needs of its people. 
 
Notes 
1 The Balfour Declaration dated November 2, 1917 was just five weeks before Jerusalem fell 
to the forces of the British General Edmund Allenby. In so doing, Great Britain was basically 
reneging on its promises of independence made to the Arabs in return for their support against the 
Turks during WWI (Heikal, 1996: 28-29). 
2 According to the King-Crane commission, appointed by American President Woodrow 
Wilson for the purpose of determining which of the Western nations should act as the mandatory 
power for Palestine, “...the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a 
‘right’ to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously 
considered.” (Laqueur & Rubin, 1995: 27). 
3 Harkabi was a former Chief of Israeli Military intelligence (1955-1959), and an advisor on 
intelligence to the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. While aiming at breaking-down the 
Arab consensus, the US subsequently proclaimed itself an “honest broker.” (US Letter of Assurances 
to the Palestinians, October 18, 1991, in Laqueur and Rubin, 1995: 576). In the same letter, the 
Americans indicated that negotiations would take place along two tracks between Israel and Arab 
States and Israel and Palestinians, effectively singling them out through the very structure of the 
negotiation framework (Laqueur and Rubin, 1995: 574). 
4 In a Report of a Study Group Convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences it 
was proposed: “Regional water plans would be an important component of the bilateral and 
multilateral accords. The opportunity to increase access to water would serve as one of the 
inducements for Israel to negotiate security accords with its neighbors. Projects to be given high 
priority would include the Unity Dam on the Yarmouk River involving Jordan, Syria and Israel, 
pipelines for water from the Litani River in Lebanon and from Turkey or Egypt, and a joint Jordan-
Israel desalinization plant in Eilat/Aqaba” (Lesch, 1992: 158). Notice the pattern of concessions 
required of the Arabs so that Israel would simply accept negotiating security accords with its 
neighbors; Israeli security of course being paramount over other actors’ considerations. A security 
for peace rather than the Madrid land for peace formula is clearly being suggested here several years 
before Netanyahu’s coming to power. 
5 According to Benjamin Netanyahu, Yitzhak Rabin, the assassinated Labor party leader and 
ex-Prime Minister, “was very clear that there were no limitations whatsoever on Israeli construction 
in Jerusalem. Rabin was the one who authorized the building of Har Homa (Jabal Ghoneim colony)” 
(Netanyahu, 1997a: 51). 
6 For instance, despite Barak's intransigence and in response to abstract pledges, the US 
declared its commitment to maintaining Israel's “qualitative edge” and “deterrent capability.” This 
included upgrading Israel's airforce and Arrow defense systems ($ 250 million), increasing aid from 
$ 1.9 billion to $ 2.4 billion a year, and finally obtaining congressional approval to provide $ 1.2 
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billion so that Israel can build “fortified” by-pass roads to isolated ‘settlements’ in the occupied 
West Bank to ensure a “secure” Israeli redeployment under the terms of the 1998 Wye agreement 
(Usher, 1999). 
7 Commenting on the result, and perhaps justifying Netanyahu’s position and his own call for 
redesigning the Oslo agreements, Kissinger stated that any analogy to the early stages of the peace 
process was illusory. As he put it “in the earlier negotiation, step-by-step progress relieved tensions 
and built confidence. On the West Bank, the opposite was the case. Both sides had jumped into the 
"peace process" without having clarified workable objectives and expected to wrest that clarity from 
the process itself. Instead, it has compounded their perplexities. This was no accident. Clearly, 
Arafat was led to believe by Israeli, American and European interlocutors that the final destination 
was at least the '67 borders and recognition of a Palestinian statehood. But that ignored the vast 
difference in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO compared with those between Israel and 
the neighboring Arab states” (Kissinger, 1997). 
8 Note how Mansour equates Jewish Israel with Arab Palestine and Jordan. He also seems to 
be insinuating that extending the water to Israel may be the price Egypt, in its ‘commitment’ to the 
Arab cause, may have to pay. In what is tantamount to a trial balloon, Mansour appears to be 
reviving the offer which Sadat had made in the early 1980s to extend the Nile water to Israel in 
return for Arab land; an offer which the Menachem Begin Likud government rejected at the time. 
This is where the Toushki project, claiming to create a new living space in the South-Western part of 
the country, may come in handy as a scenario. Based on this project, Egypt would make a case for 
much needed additional sources of water supply, which could be accessed if an agreement is reached 
whereby African states would gain financially. Egypt would receive more water and so would Israel. 
Any internal opposition could then be denounced as unpatriotic, foolish and perhaps even treasonous 
since it would undermine the ‘national project’ of Toushki. In this set scenario, providing Israel with 
water would be the ‘nationalistic’ thing to do. Perhaps at the heart of this matter lies Egypt’s real 
hostility to the Islamic regime in Sudan, which appears to be oblivious to financial incentives of the 
kind and therefore perceived as an obstacle to such a grand design. 
9 Moshe Dayan told President Jimmy Carter, before Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel that “the 
future is with Egypt. If you take one wheel off a car, it won’t drive....” Mirroring this view, Carter 
indicated in his memoirs that “it was fairly obvious that the key to any future military threats against 
Israel was the Egyptians...” Yitzhak Rabin indicated “Syria alone was no problem whatsoever for 
Israel,” and that “terrorism is not a threat to Israel’s existence... I wish that the so called PLO would 
be the only problem.” “Egypt,” he stressed “is the key country” (quotes in Finkelstein 1995: 171). 
10 Commenting on several polls in the Arab World related to this matter, Edward Said (1995: 
134) observed: “In every instance public opinion has in fact expressed no enthusiasm for 
normalization with Israel. On mass level this suggests that the sense of defeat is not quite as 
widespread and prostrate as official policy and the logic of capitulationist intellectuals would have 
us believe.” In the same vein, an Al-Ahram Weekly poll result indicated that “the Egyptian public ... 
(has) its own ax to grind with Israel” (as quoted by Gerges 1995: 75). Even Shenouda III, the Coptic 
Patriarch of Egypt, prohibited his followers from making pilgrimages to Jerusalem, declaring that 
“(t)he Christians of Egypt will not be the traitors of the Arab World” (as quoted in Heikal, 1996a: 
553). 
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11 At the Oslo meeting held during the first week of November 1999, between Arafat, Barak 
and Bill Clinton, Barak, according to Newsweek “signaled his willingness to accept a Palestinian 
state. But to the consternation of the Clinton administration and Palestinian leaders, he also made it 
clear he wants to disentangle the two economies…. Many Palestinians believe that such 
disengagement would be a disaster…” Note the psychological pressure exerted and the clear 
Palestinian dependency on Israel. One can not but wonder as to the nature of the prospective ‘state’ 
(Klaidman & Rees, 1999). 
12 A typical exponential change curve moves along in an almost horizontal line for a long 
period of time (tradition) before showing any marked shift in direction. Then, once there is a 
significant increase in the rate of change there is a sudden acceleration until the curve moves into a 
nearly vertical direction--a wave of mainstream change or revolution (Burton, 1990: 53-54). 
13 Quote de-italicized. Irrationality here is not to be confused with the sense in which non-
rationality has been used above in the Finnish and Vietnamese cases. Irrational decisions could be 
made based on extreme caution and calculations. To many it would seem to be rational not to waste 
away sunk costs--a situation in which seeming rational inputs could lead to irrational outcomes. 
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